UNTIL a few years ago only a few physicists questioned the usual interpretation of quantum theory. Their criticisms were doubtless useful, but remained mainly on the philosophical level; no consistent alternative interpretation of the successful mathematical formalism was offered. Now the situation has altered substantially : several realistic, rational, and deterministic interpretations of the same formalism have been advanced. As was to be expected, they are strongly opposed by the upholders of the official philosophy of quantum theory, which is essentially of a positivistic character. The purpose of the present paper is to examine a recent manifestation of this conservative standpoint, namely, the article in which Professor L. Rosenfeld 1 of Manchester, who is Bohr's best known pupil, criticises the new realistic, rationalistic, and deterministic trends.
What is Complementary to What ?
The doctrine of complementarity is an interpretation of Heisenbcrg s uncertainty relations. In the case of mechanical systems, the latter state that it is impossible to know simultaneously, with an arbitrary accuracy, the values of any two conjugate variables, such as the position and the momentum of an electron ; in the case of a radiation field, the uncertainty relations consist of similar statements regarding the electric and the magnetic field strengths. The doctrine of complementarity, far from interpreting such mathematical relations in terms of errors of measurements of objectively existent attributes (as is commonly believed), claims that it is meaningless to ascribe simultaneously an objective position and an objective momentum to an electron, or all of its components to a radiation field. Conjugate quantities were called by Bohr complementary to each other, in the sense that they are (a) both mutually exclusive, since the sharpening in the value of one of them results in a larger uncertainty regarding the complementary quantity ; and (b) both needed to achieve a complete description of experimental results, which the present form of the quantum theory is assumed to yield, at least in the atomic realm.
Owing to the fact that complementary aspects are mutually exclusive, it is impossible-thus Bohr argues-to afford a single welldefined picture of atomic phenomena, being on the other hand indispensable to split the image of reality into two complementary models, or pictures, which can be applied in succession, never simultaneously in all rigour, and this simply because the aspects covered by each model are not simultaneously observed. In the particular case of entities endowed with mass (such as electrons), one group of variables (position and time) describes the corpuscular aspect, while the group of quantities complementary to these (momentum and energy respectively) describes-as can be seen by recalling de Broglie's relation between momentum and wave-length, and Planck-Einstein's relation between energy and frequency-the wave aspect. In this regard, the contention of the doctrine of complementarity is, that microsystems endowed with mass are neither particles, nor waves, nor wavicles, but that they simply are not in themselves, for nothing is supposed to exist apart from the means of observation. Hence, according to complementarity, the words ' particle' and ' wave' designate neither material objects nor properties of material objects ; they have no ontological status, but solely an empirical one, for they arc only entities altering the description of certain experiments.
Most people believe that the doctrine of complementarity merely expresses the obvious fact that we alter nature whenever we act in order to know it; in other words, that when we perform a measurement we establish an interaction between a piece of apparatus and the object under consideration whereby we unavoidably disturb the latter. This is a valid interpretation of Heisenberg's uncertainty relations, which the doctrine of complementarity attempts to interpret ; but that conception is contradictory to the doctrine of complementarity, which is not centred in things that are to be observed and that exist before and after the acts of observation, but which is centred in observations-because, it is argued, it would be ' metaphysical' to assume that there is something beyond observational data. It is not merely that the doctrine of complementarity stresses the doubtless active rdle of the experimenter, the active side of knowledge ; it goes beyond this, asserting that observations are the alpha and the omega of knowledge, that there is nothing which is being observed, nothing beyond observation itself.
Bohr has carefully and untiringly explained, for almost a quarter of a century, that we cannot attribute an autonomous physical reality (Le. a reality independent of the experimenter) to objects at the atomic scale.
1 Philipp Frank, an authorised spokesman of the same philosophical trend, has elucidated this point with his usual clarity, explaining that what we call electron is not a bit of matter but a set of symbols : ' The " electron " is a set of physical quantities which we introduce to state a system of principles from which we can logically derive the pointer readings on the instruments of measurements.' * Of course, the same is deemed to be valid for the qualities of things ; thus for instance the momentum of an electron ' has never existed except in so far as we have a set-up which allows the definition of a " momentum".'* Things and qualities of things are said to exist only in so far as features cf experimental set-ups and acts of observations in themselves. Naturwissenscluften, 1933, 21 245-50, p. 247 (see also ' Light and Life ', Nature, 1933, 131, 422, 457) ; ' Kausalitat und Komplementaritat' (referred to below as KK), Erkenntnb, 1936, 6, 293-303, p. 295 ; ' Le problcme causal en physique atomiquc ' (referred to below as PCPA), in the collective volume Les noiivellfs thiories de la physique, Paris, 1939, 11-32, p. 25 ; ' Newton's principles and modem atomic mechanics ' (referred to below as NP), in the collective volume ed. by the Royal Society, Neii 'toii Tercemiitary Celebrations, Cambridge, 1947, 56-61, p. 59 Notice once again that it is not the numerical value of the attribute that is changed by the act of its measurement-since this would entail that it had a value before its measurement. In all this we have neither atomic objects nor their attributes considered as things-in-themselves :. complementarists avowedly do not make statements about the real world, they maintain that quantum mechanics does not speak of real objects that are observed but only of experimental arrangements.
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On this purely epistemological ground, complementarists have criticised two very common notions. According to one of these, ' Heisenberg's relations say that it is impossible to measure simultaneously the position and the velocity of an electron '. This is wrong, explains Bohr, because it implies that position and velocity are welldefined attributes of the object, whereas the point is just that we are forced to give up the notion of autonomous attributes of the object' (selbstandige Attribute da Objektes).* The second popular notion criticised by the complementarists is that ' The electron has no simultaneously determined velocity and position, these being actually indeterminate'. This interpretation is wrong, says Frank, because it assumes that there is something (the electron with indeterminate properties) that pertains to the real world.
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What is at stake in all this is not the structure of micro-objects, but the whole theory of knowledge with its old struggle between materialism and immaterialism : complementarity is not a physical but a philosophical doctrine, because it does not refer to matter in motion but to concepts and their verbalisations. As Frank says so amusingly, ' All the confusion is produced by speaking of an object instead of the way in which some words are used '.* This fact, that the doctrine of complementarity is of a philosophical, not of a scientific nature, is not willingly accepted by most complementarist physicists who, like Rosenfeld, regard it as ' the most direct expression of a fact The duality of interpretations thus assumed its final form : the and of de Broglie's discovery does not have the direct meaning that both waves and corpuscles exist at the same time, but has the indirect meaning that the same physical reality admits of two possible interpretations, each of which is as true as the other, although the two cannot be combined into one picture. The logician would say : the and is not in the language of physics, but in the metalanguage, that is, in a language which speaks about the language of physics. Or, in another terminology, the and belongs, not in physics, but in the philosophy of physics ; it does not refer to physical objects, but to possible descriptions of physical objects, and thus falls into the realm of the philosopher. The philosophical nature of all this debate will become more apparent when going over to its central problem, which is also the central problem of philosophy, viz. the question of the relation of subject and object.
Esse est Percipi
In order to be classified as an idealist one does not need to speak the whole day long about the spirit, or to maintain that life is a dream ; it is enough to maintain that nothing exists or appears by itself, autonomously, independently from some mind. Berkeley explained it long ago in his straightforward way :
The table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it; [but] as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things widiout any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is percipi [their being is to be perceived], nor is it possible they should have any existence, out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them. Nowadays it is hard to maintain such a subjective idealism in ordinary life ; it is easier to maintain it for a domain accessible only to the specialist-for instance, atomic physics. Thus, we often find the amusing spectacle that subjective idealism is asserted with regard to microscopic events, whereas some sort of materialism is retained for the macroscopic level. The following is an example of this epistemological dualism : In classical physics it is possible to establish a sharp distinction between the system investigated and the means of observation, and therefore to ignore die latter in framing our conception of die phenomenon. The existence of die quantum of action makes such a distinction impossible because it imposes a limit upon die analysis of die interaction between die system and the apparatus which fixes die circumstances in which we observe it. It is diercfore die indivisible whole formed by die system and die instruments of observation which now defines the ' phenomenon \ x Bohr has sometimes adopted consistently the idealist point of view, extending it to the macroscopic level. He has argued that, since every observation entails a finite interaction with the instrument, ' one cannot attribute to the phenomena nor to the instrument of observation an autonomous physical reality in the ordinary sense of the word '.* He went so far as to approve Heisenberg's remark that' ordinary (Le. macroscopic) phenomena are in a way engendered by repeated observations '.* But usually he attributes validity to idealism at the atomic level only, a favourite statement being that in the analysis of quantum effects we are faced with the impossibility ' of drawing any sharp separation between an independent behaviour of atomic objects and their interaction with the measuring instruments which serve to define the conditions under which the phenomena occur '.* The central point is thus the negation of the autonomous existence of atomic objects.' Since atomism, that stronghold of traditional materialism, could no longer be rejected (as it was in Mach's days), it became advisable to denaturalise it: atoms are at last granted a right to existence, but only on the ideal plane, only as ' auxiliary concepts '.
• Once materialism has been disposed of, it is easy to dispense with the notion that everything comes from somedung else, that is, with causality. Bohr explained clearly, for once, that the rejection of causality was only a consequence of the rejection of materialism: Peniauc, 1951, No. 16, 12-16 We have been forced to forego the ideal of causality in atomic physics solely because, as a consequence of the unavoidable interaction between die object of experiment and the measurement instrumentsan interaction which cannot be corrected for if these instruments are to allow die unambiguous application of the concepts that are needed for the description of the experiments-we cannot speak any longer of an autonomous behaviour of the physical object. 1 Thus, we see clearly that the celebrated crisis of causality is nothing but a consequence of the adoption of an idealist theory of knowledge : it is not a simple result of modern physics, it is a tenet of modern positivism.
Sozein ta Phaiuomena
The most important point in this controversy is that most scientists, at least when they are doing research, share the materialistic principle of the objective existence of a gradually knowable thing-in-itself, whereas positivism maintains that there is no such ' hidden' reality behind appearance, since the object is exhausted by its perception (nowadays by its measurement). This posirivistic axiom is very old, but in modern times it was first clearly stated by Berkeley,* who maintained that everything is such as it appears to be, there being no such contrast between appearance and reality, for everything is appearance. Hence the methodological prescription : sozein ta phainomena, sctluare . apparmtias, to give account of phenomena (appearances). ' This phenomenalist attitude, typical of positivism since Comte, has been adopted by the upholders of the official philosophy of quantum mechanics, one of whose best representatives, Heisenberg, has explicitly stated that the quantum theory does not assume the existence of a Ding an sich behind the phenomena (or appearances). 4 In a more technical language this is expressed in the principle of observables, according to which physics, or at any rate atomic physics, is only concerned with observable properties-meaning the actually observed ones, with exclusion of all sorts of ' hidden parameters'. Thus, •Werner Heisenberg, Wandlungen in den Grundlagen der Natutwissensdutften, 7th ed., Zurich, 1947, p. 8<S physics is not presented as the investigation of what Bacon called nature Hbera (such as it is without our intervention) through the natura vexata (such as it becomes when we subject it to our cognitive actions) -but as the examination of appearances, the latter being conceived (as we shall see) as unanalysable wholes.
For instance, Bohr l warns especially against the use of phrases such as ' disturbance of phenomena by observation ', Le. against the use of the concept of vexed nature. The reason is plain : such phrases imply the assertion of the objective existence of a reality hidden, for the time being, behind the appearances ; of a nature Hbera existing while we are not acting upon it. That is why Bohr redefined the notion of phenomenon so as to eliminate from it every reference to observed things; in fact, he repeatedly advocated the ' limitation of the use of the word phenomenon to refer exclusively to observations obtained under specific circumstances, including an account of the whole experiment '.* All this is admitted and elucidated by Weizsacker, who suggests that one should not condemn causality as such but only the notion of objective causality and, in general, the notion of thing in itself in the sense of existing independently from the subject. Being a learned theologian, he does not conclude from this the validity of materialism, as Rosenfeld does, but he confirms his mystic faith. He would never dream of saying that ' From the dialectical point of view it is almost self-evident to observe that the essential part played by the observer in the definition of the phenomena is perfectly consonant with the fundamentally materialistic character of science '.* We have already observed the inconsistency of maintaining subjective idealism for the atomic realm and materialism for the macroscopic level (sec. 2). Atoms do not exist apart from instruments, maintain idealists. Now, the instruments have avowedly an atomic structure-so far not taken into account by the theory. So that, if one asserts that' Only instruments exist', then one is implicitly stating the proposition that is contradictory to that, namely, ' Atoms exist objectively as well'. This is why Bohr always insists that instruments must be treated in a classical (Le. macroscopic) way-just in order to 1 Bohr, DE, p. 237 * N. Bohr,' On the Notions of Complementarity and Causality ', Dwlectica, 1948, 3, 312-319, p. 317. See also PCPA, p. 24 and DE, pp. 237-238 3 Carl Friedrich von Weizsacker, Zum Weltbilti in Physih, 5th ed., Stuttgart, 1951, pp. 30, 41-42, 76 and passim * Rosenfeld, SC, p. 407 prevent a further analysis of the famous interaction, an analysis that would show what the contribution of each, object and subject, is to the phenomenon. Pauli avoids the mentioned inconsistency by taking a further step ; he declares that not only must we deal with observations without implying observed things, but we must not even deal with actual observations-only with possible ones: ' The actual observation appears as an event outside the range of a description by physical laws and brings forth, in general, a discontinuous selection out of the several possibilities foreseen by the statistical laws of the new theory.' 1 Thus, according to the representatives of the official philosophy of quantum mechanics, as for Berkeley, observations must be accepted at their face value and every attempt to analyse and understand them is forbidden forever.
It seemed as though, from now on, we could not be sure whether we are observing the object, or whether the object is observing us, or whether it is observing itself, or whether we are not doing physics but introspective psychology : the obsolete distinction between subject and object is no longer valid, complementarists say ; in its place we have an unanalysable muddle-not precisely a unity in which both terms interact in a determined way, but just a ' sealed unit' which we are forbidden to look into. It is consistent to match such a stand with any sort of idealistic philosophy. But it is difficult to understand why Rosenfeld should advocate, in the name of materialism, the rejection of the distinction established by ' the narrow and antiquated brand of materialism ' between subject and object.
It seems to the author that Roscnfeld wrongly identities objective (pertaining to or related to the object) with absolute, which in physics means independent from standards and frames of reference. Such an identification (and the correlative of subjective with relative) was held by Newton, but is now untenable. The Doppler effect is a classical example of an objective though relative phenomenon : objective, because it is produced independently of the existence of human beings, independently of the subject; relative, because it is not the same for all material systems irrespective of their state of motion (it does not involve one object but a potential infinity of objects). The relativistic increase of mass with velocity is often presented as an apparent phenomenon depending on the observer-which is also false. It is certainly relative, but it is also objective, because it takes place independently of its being observed or not; and, thanks to the convertibility of kinetic energy into radiation energy, by accelerating an electron in the betatron we are rewarded with X-rays that are as objective as the causes producing them. Thus not only invariant but also relative entities may be perfectly objective. On the other hand, absolute entities and relations may not have an objective meaning.
The theories of relativity work with objective facts-some of them relative and others absolute ; and, in giving account of reality, they make use of ideal entities, which in turn may be relative or absolute. Relativity, like any other branch of physical science, is concerned only with objective facts, never with facts essentially dependent upon the observer (i.e. subjective facts)-in spite of Bohr's statements. Relative entities are expressed in a non-invariant way, whereas absolute entities are expressed in an invariant way-with the proviso that the categories ' relative ' and ' absolute ' are in turn relative, for they refer always to a certain set of transformations ; whereas, on the other hand, the degree of objectivity of a theory is not dependent on the extent of its invariancc, but on the extent of its agreement with the objects to which it refers. The observer, who plays such a central role in the positivistic presentations of relativity, is, as in the case of quantum mechanics, just one of the possible material systems entering into a relative phenomenon.
Contrary to Rosenfeld, I think that the character of objectivity of a set of symbols does not depend upon their properties of invariance (which, let us repeat, is relative to a given set of transformations), but only upon the physical meaning attached to them. That is, it does not depend upon the form of the equations but upon their content-upon what logical empiricists call the semantical rules. If, within the context of a given theory, we say that ' The symbol x stands for the position of a mass-point', this statement will form part of the objective content of that theory in so far as mass-points can be said to exist, and even if we arc not able to measure the effective value of x. This statement will have an absolute meaning in so far as quality is concerned (since x will not cease to represent a position, it will not turn into a momentum, for example) ; and it will have a relative meaning as regards quantity, since the numerical value of x will depend on the system of reference (whether or not .an actual measurement is performed). In a simple definition such as that we can understand how objectivity is not necessarily linked with invariance or absoluteness.
Mutatis mutandis, the same applies to quantum theory. Rosenfeld asserts that the objective content of this theory, ' the objective expression for the quantal laws of nature', is represented by the equations connecting the operators among each other, because these equations (for example, the commutation rules) are invariant under the canonical transformations, ' which express the passage from one mode of observation to another '.* Now, the operator equations are susceptible to an infinity of representations which, when explicit reference to observational data is made, refer each to a ' mode of observation', to a ' particular condition of observation'. The first point I wish to stress is that such statements amount to the assertion that the quantum laws do refer to objects existing independently from our acts of observation ; they imply that there is a unique reality behind the countless appearances, behind our representations of that reality. And this plainly contradicts Rosenfeld's basic contention that no such separation of the object from the subject is even conceivable. So that, without noticing it, he is telling us that we may retain scientific objectivity on condition that we do not accept the epistemological foundations of the usual interpretation of quantum theory-which is a fine piece of empiricist logic.
But there is more to it: once again Rosenfeld confuses, I believe, ' absolute ' and ' objective '. A choice of representation, contrary to his remark, does not necessarily involve subjectivity-the same as the choice of a frame of reference does not eliminate objectivity ; it only involves, from the mathematical point of view, a specialisation. The canonical invariance of certain basic equations do not provide the objective content of a theory. One might construct, and this is actually being done every day, theories that are invariant under a host of transformations, but which simply do not work, that is, which have no objective content-as happens with most meson field theories. On the other hand, we may limit ourselves to the choice of a special representation (in particular, to the choice of space and time as basic variables) and still obtain most if not all of the verified results of quantum mechanics. Moreover, what will happen to the mathematically beautiful framework of transformations in Hilbert space the day that the present basic equations (such as the wave equations) are recognised as just linear approximations to non-linear equations ? As has been pointed out by Bohm, 1 if we accept such a possibility, the whole framework breaks down and we are compelled to sacrifice mathematical generality and choose, for the benefit of physical generality, a special representation. And this is not idle speculation, for we know from experience in other fields of physics that linearity is not an absolute and ultimate quality of nature but only an approximation of our knowledge of it.
To sum up, Rosenfeld seems to be inconsistent when he identifies objectivity with absoluteness, or invariance, for he is then led to admit implicitly that matter exists independently of its being perceivedwhich runs counter to the official philosophy of quantum mechanics. Further, I think he is wrong in asserting that identity, because there are relative objectivities as well as absolute subjectivities.
